Germ Warfare in the Patent Courts by Behringer, John W.
Hastings Law Journal
Volume 31 | Issue 4 Article 4
1-1980
Germ Warfare in the Patent Courts
John W. Behringer
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
wangangela@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation
John W. Behringer, Germ Warfare in the Patent Courts, 31 Hastings L.J. 883 (1980).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal/vol31/iss4/4
Germ Warfare in the Patent Courts?
By JOHN W. BEHRINGER*
Assume that a medical researcher is working on a cure for classic
hemophilia, the tragic hereditary disorder that causes profuse and un-
controllable bleeding from the slightest wounds. A deficiency in the
blood of the substance thromboplastinogen, also known as "AHF" (an-
tihemophilic factor), characterizes the disease. The dilemma facing the
researcher is that while hemophilia can be controlled by periodic ad-
ministration of AHF, the process of extracting AHF from the plasma of
normal blood is both painstaking and prohibitively expensive for most
people afflicted with the disease.
Assume further that the researcher, after years of labor, finds in
the soil a bacterium that after purification has the remarkable ability to
produce AHF-plenty of AHF, enough to provide relief for all victims
of classic hemophilia. If the bacterium has never been isolated or
known to exist before the researcher's discovery, could the researcher
obtain a patent on the bacterium? Would the answer be different if the
researcher created the bacterium in a laboratory by altering the genetic
structure of a known bacterium, using the new technology of DNA re-
combinant engineering? 1
The United States Patent and Trademark Office (Patent Office or
the Office) takes the position that in either case the researcher should be
allowed a patent with claims to a process of using the microorganism
and to a composition comprised of the microorganism mixed with an
inanimate carrier, assuming that the composition is useful.2 The Office
* B.S., 1959, University of Dayton; J.D., 1968, George Washington University.
Member, District of Columbia Bar.
1. Recombinant genetics recently has resulted in development of the first bacterium to
produce human insulin, see Begley & Abramson, The DNA Industry, NEWSWEEK, August
20, 1979, at 53, as well as development of the first bacterium to synthesize human interferon,
an important antiviral substance normally produced by white blood cells, see Washington
Star, Jan. 17, 1980, at 1.
2. The Patent Office's granting of patents with claims to processes of snythesizing
chemicals by fermentation of microorganisms finds clear judicial approval in Guaranty
Trust Co. v. Union Solvents Corp., 54 F.2d 400 (D. Del. 1931), aff'dper curiam, 61 F.2d
1041 (3d. Cir. 1932), cert. denied, 288 U.S. 614 (1933), and in In re Mancy, 499 F.2d 1289
(C.C.P.A. 1974). As to the patentability of mixtures of microorganisms with inanimate car-
riers, however, it appears that no decision specifically on point has been reported. The cos-
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insists, however, that the researcher should not be permitted to claim
the microorganism itself, a position which may affect the researcher's
ability to capitalize on industrial use of the microorganism.
This Article explores the basis for the Patent Office's argument
that bacteria alone are not patentable subject matter and analyzes In re
Bergy,3 a recent decision by the United States Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals (CCPA) that rejected the Patent Office's argument. The
practical effect of that decision, which the Supreme Court has agreed to
review,4 also will be discussed. The Article suggests that the Supreme
Court is likely to reverse the CCPA and in so doing possibly prompt
the Patent Office to reexamine other patent policies, causing it to allow
even fewer microbiological product claims than it has in the past.
Microorganisms as Patentable Subject Matter
A patent is a federal right, granted through the Commissioner of
Patents and Trademarks, to exclude all others from making, using, or
selling a particular invention for seventeen years.5 For each patent
granted, the Patent Office issues a printed specification in which the
invention is described in detail. At the end of the specification there
appear one or more carefully worded clauses that identify precisely
what the patentee may exclude others from making, using, or selling.
Those clauses are called the patent's "claims."'6 Whatever a claim cov-
ers or embraces by its terms (in the language of the patent bar,
whatever it "reads on") may not be made, used, or sold in the United
States without permission of the patent owner. Before granting a pat-
ent, Patent Office Examiners must be certain that the invention claimed
is new7 and nonobvious8 and that the claims are understandable and
reasonable in scope.9
When applied to the hypothetical discoveries previously described,
the Patent Office's position on bacteria discoveries might not provide
for complete protection. The researcher could obtain a patent sufficient
to prevent others from using the microorganism to produce AHF and
from mixing the microorganism with the particular carrier. Unobtain-
est is Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127 (1948), discussed at note 79
infra.
3. 596 F.2d 952 (C.C.P.A. 1979).
4. 100 S. Ct. 261 (1979).
5. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1976).
6. Id. § 112.
7. Id. § I01.
8. Id. § 103.
9. Id. § 112.
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able, however, would be a patent with claims entitling the applicant to
prevent others from cultivating the bacterium in the United States and
using it in an entirely different process or exporting it to pharmaceuti-
cal manufacturers outside this country. I0 If, on the other hand, the Pat-
ent Office's position were liberalized, the applicant could patent the
microorganism itself and acquire the exclusive right to all of those ac-
tivities for seventeen years.
The rights unobtainable under the Patent Office's current view of
the law could have substantial value, especially in the not unusual situ-
ation in which a bacterium found to have one beneficial property is
later discovered to have additional valuable utilities. The species of
bacterium known as Streptomycesgrseus, for example, although at first
believed to be useful only for synthesizing the antitubercular drug
streptomycin,I1 later was found capable of producing such other useful
products as vitamin B 1212 and the antibiotic candicidin.13 If the bacte-
rium itself could be claimed in a patent, the patent owner could exact
royalties from all who used the bacterium, for whatever purpose, dur-
ing the seventeen year period of exclusivity. With only the claims the
Patent Office presently will allow, however, such broad protection is
beyond reach.
Moreover, broader protection would be available if the AHF pro-
ducer were a new chemical compound, rather than a bacterium. 14 In
such a case, the Patent Office would not hesitate to grant a patent with
a claim to the compound itself,15 thereby affording the patentee across-
the-board, exclusive rights in the compound regardless of its later dis-
covered uses and regardless of whether others also used it to produce
AHF. For the Patent Office, the critical difference is that bacteria are
alive; the Patent Office believes that Congress never intended for it to
10. Cf. Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518 (1972) (patent not in-
fringed by exportation of unassembled components of machine protected by combination
patent).
11. See U.S. Patent No. 2,449,866, summarized in 614 OFFICIAL GAzETTE PAT. OFF.
758 (1948).
12. See U.S. Patent No. 2,563,794, summarized in 649 OFFICIAL GAZETrE PAT. OFF.
302 (1951).
13. See U.S. Patent No. 2,992,162, summarized in 768 OFFICIAL GAZErrE PAT. OFF.
471 (1961).
14. Conceivably, for example, a new compound could be found capable of producing
AHF by interaction with some known chemical. It is well accepted that compounds useful
as intermediates to produce other useful compounds are themselves patentable subject mat-
ter. See In re Kirk, 376 F.2d 936, 945 (C.C.P.A. 1967); Note, Do Chemical Intermediates
Have Patentable Utiityi?, 29 GEo. WASH. L. Rv. 87 (1960); Note, The Requirement of Utility
in Chemical Patent Applications, 20 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 727, 734-35 (1952).
15. See note 14 supra.
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grant patents on living organisms as such.16 Although Congress has
created an exception for new varieties of certain types of plants, 17 that
exception does not include bacteria.'
The law of patents in the United States is embodied in the 1952
Patent Act, as amended. 19 The Act uses three separate sections to es-
tablish patentable subject matter. Section 101 declares what may be
claimed in what is sometimes referred to as a "utility" patent: "Who-
ever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manu-
facture, or composition of matter . . . may obtain a patent therefor
. ... "20 Section 161 describes what may be claimed in a "plant" pat-
ent: "Whoever invents or discovers and asexually reproduces any dis-
tinct and new variety of plant, including cultivated sports, mutants,
hybrids, and newly found seedlings, other than a tuber propagated
plant or a plant found in an uncultivated state, may obtain a patent
therefor .... ,,21 Finally, section 171 sets forth the subject matter for
"design" patents: "Whoever invents any new, original and ornamental
design for an article of manufacture may obtain a patent therefor
"22
According to the Patent Office, none of the above sections permits
it to grant patents with claims to bacteria per se. The patent statute
allows claims to processes of using bacteria 3 and claims to composi-
tions containing bacteria in admixture with inanimate matter,24 but the
Office asserts that microorganisms themselves do not fall within any of
the statutory categories of invention: process, machine, manufacture,
composition of matter, plant, or ornamental design.25 According to the
Office, only special legislation could permit it to allow such claims.26
16. Exparle Bergy, 197 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 78, 79 (Pat. & Trademark Office Bd. App.
1976). See Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at app. G, Parker v. Bergy, 100 S. Ct. 261 (1979).
17. Plant Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ 161-164 (1976). See text accompanying notes 72-102
infra.
18. See In re Arzberger, 112 F.2d 834 (C.C.P.A. 1940).
19. Statutory patent law is codified at Title 35 of the United States Code.
20. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1976).
21. Id. § 161.
22. Id. § 171.
23. See Exparte Prescott, 19 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 178 (Pat. & Trademark Office Bd. App.
1932).
24. See Exparte Bergy, 197 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 78, 81 (Pat. & Trademark Office Bd. App.
1976); U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF CLASSIFICATION (1979) (patents
classified in Class 71, subclass 6 (fertilizer compositions containing bacteria) and in Class
195, subclass 59 (fermentation products containing living bacteria)). But see note 129 infra.
25. See cases cited note 16 supra.
26. See cases cited note 16 supra.
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The Patent Office position that bacteria are not themselves patent-
able subject matter will soon be reviewed by the United States Supreme
Court. The Court will review two cases consolidated on appeal to the
CCPA which successfully challenged that position.27 Each case began
with an appeal from a decision by the Patent and Trademark Office
Board of Appeals rejecting claims to newly discovered bacteria.2 8 The
unsuccessful applicants each obtained reversals from the CCPA,29 both
of which were later vacated3" and then reasserted by the CCPA on re-
mand in a consolidated proceeding.3 1 The court on remand ruled that
the utility patent categories of "manufacture" and "composition of
matter" can indeed embrace bacteria,32 provided they are in forms de-
veloped by humans, not as found in nature.33 If those microorganisms
are useful and nonobvious, concluded the CCPA, they are patentable
themselves and may be claimed as such in utility patents, just as inani-
mate chemical compounds may be claimed. 34 The CCPA decisions, if
upheld, mean that discoverers or inventors of new forms of bacteria
need not settle for claims to the process of using the bacteria and to the
compositions containing the bacteria in admixture with inert carriers.
Instead, they can enjoy total patent protection for such discoveries.
In re Bergy
The appeal by Upjohn Company scientists Malcolm Bergy, John
Coats, and Vedpal Malik involved an application for a utility patent on
a bacterium discovered in a soil sample from Arizona. The scientists
named the bacterium "Streptomyces vellosus"; "Streptomyces" identi-
fies the genus to which the newly discovered microorganism belongs,
while "vellosus" is the term Bergy and his co-workers selected to desig-
nate its species. The particular strain of Streptomyces vellosus which
the team isolated was the first of the species to be discovered. Once a
detailed description of the bacterium is published, however, as will
27. In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952 (C.C.P.A. 1979).
28. Exparte Bergy, 197 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 78 (Pat. & Trademark Office Bd. App. 1976).
The Board's affirmance of Chakrabarty's rejection is not reported.
29. In re Chakrabarty, 571 F.2d 40, 42 (C.C.P.A. 1978); In re Bergy, 563 F.2d 1031
(C.C.P.A. 1977).
30. The Bergy case was vacated by the Supreme Court in Parker v. Bergy, 438 U.S. 902
(1978). In Chakrabar,, the CCPA vacated its own decision: In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 957
(C.C.P.A. 1979).
31. In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952 (C.C.P.A. 1979). See notes 46-50, 54-71 & accompanying
text infra for a more complete discussion of the procedural history of the two cases.
32. 596 F.2d at 975.
33. Id. at 976.
34. Id. at 975.
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happen no later than when the Bergy patent is issued, additional
strains 35 of the bacterium probably will be found by others.
Streptomyces vellosus is a useful microorganism because of its abil-
ity to biosynthesize the antibiotic lincomycin when fermented under
controlled conditions, much as yeast can be fermented to produce alco-
hol. Lincomycin generally is used to treat serious bacterial infections
in humans allergic to penicillin,36 particularly when the infections are
located in the urinary tract. The special value of Streptomyces vellosus
derives from its ability to produce lincomycin at relatively high temper-
atures (about 45°C.) and without coproducing a less active antibiotic
known as "lincomycin B."' 37 Those properties set Streptomyces vellosus
apart from Streptomyces lincolnensis, the species of lincomycin-produc-
ing bacterium previously used for commercial production of linco-
mycin.38 Streptomyces lincolnensis generates an antibiotic mixture
containing about 95 parts of lincomycin and 5 parts of lincomycin B,
and it requires lower production temperatures, in the range of about 18
to 40'C. Hence, until the discovery by the Bergy team of the unique
capabilities of Streptomyces vellosus, the manufacture of lincomycin re-
quired removal of all the lincomycin B contained in the crude prod-
uct-a time consuming and expensive procedure.39 The desirability of
conducting the lincomycin-producing fermentation at 45°C., rather an
at 18 to 40'C, is that the higher temperature serves to kill several kinds
of microbes which commonly contaminate commercial fermentation
broths. If left unchecked, the alien organisms can grow in competition
with the lincomycin-producing bacterium, reducing yields and at times
causing entire batches of the fermentation liquor, typically many
thousands of gallons each, to be discarded as worthless.
The Bergy Claim
Bergy's patent application claimed a "biologically pure culture of
the microorganism Streptomyces vellosus . . . . -40 The reason for in-
35. Each newly-discovered isolate of a microorganism species is arbitrarily designated
a separate "strain" of that species, even if it appears identical to an earlier isolate of the same
species.
36. See MEDICAL ECONOMICS COMPANY, PHYSICIAN'S DESK REFERENCE 1761 (33d
ed. 1979).
37. See In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 967 (C.C.P.A. 1979).
38. See U.S. Patent No. 3,086,912, summarized in 789 OFFICIAL GAZETTE PAT. OFF.
1070 (1963). See also MEDICAL ECONOMICS COMPANY, PHYSICIAN'S DESK REFERENCE
1760 (33d ed. 1979).
39. See In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 967 (C.C.P.A. 1979).
40. See id.
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eluding the phrase "biologically pure culture" undoubtedly was to dis-
tinguish the claimed subject matter from the form of Streptomyces
vellosus that occurs in nature. As it exists in the soil, the bacterium is
impure; a menagerie of other soil microorganisms live in admixture
with it. The Patent Office thus might have interpreted a claim worded
simply "Streptomyces vellosus" as reading on that microorganism in
any condition, even as found in the soil. The qualifier "biologically
pure culture" avoids that interpretation and limits the claim to read on
only Strepltomyces vellosus free of contaminants.4'
Had the Bergy claim omitted the limiting phrase "biologically
pure culture," it could have faced a second objection by the Patent Of-
fice, the so-called "product-of-nature" objection. Claims reading on
natural objects are rejected routinely by the Patent Office on the theory
that products of nature can never be patented because they lack the
requisite novelty.42 The Patent Office, however, could accept the asser-
tion that biologically pure Streptomyces vellosus is a product of man,
not of nature.
Accordingly, the Patent Examiner in charge of the Bergy applica-
tion rejected the claim to biologically pure Streptomyces vellosus on the
sole ground that a bacterium is "non-statutory subject matter. ' 43 The
Examiner, however, did allow Bergy's claims to a process of makinglincomycin by growing Streptomyces vellosus.4 The Board of Appeals
affirmed the Examiner's rejection in a two-to-one decision,45 where-
upon Bergy and his co-workers appealed to the CCPA.
In October 1977, the CCPA, in a three-to-two decision,46 reversed
the Board in Bergy, reasoning that bacteria forms developed by man
were patentable subject matter in that they were embraced within ei-
ther or both of the terms "manufacture" and "composition of matter."
The Patent Office, dissatisfied with that ruling, successfully petitioned
the United States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari. On June 26,
1978,47 the Supreme Court granted the writ, vacated the judgment of
the CCPA, and remanded to the CCPA for reconsideration in light of
41. See Wegner, Patent Protectionfor NovelMicroorganisms Useful/or the Preparation
o/Known Products, 5 INT'L REV. INDUSTRIAL PROP. COPYRIGHT LAW 285, 290-91 (1974).
42. See notes 82-90 & accompanying text infra.
43. Exparte Bergy, 197 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 78, 79 (Pat. & Trademark Office Bd. App.
1976).
44. See In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 967 (C.C.P.A. 1979).
45. Exparte Bergy, 197 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 78 (Pat. & Trademark Office Bd. App. 1976).
46. In re Bergy, 563 F.2d 1031 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
47. Petition granted sub non Parker v. Bergy, 438 U.S. 902 (1978).
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the Court's decision in Parker v. Fook48 decided several days before.
On remand the CCPA reaffirmed its earlier holding49 and on October
29, 1979, the Supreme Court once again granted certiorari. 50
In re Chakrabarty
Dr. Ananda Chakrabarty is a prominent geneticist, formerly em-
ployed by General Electric Company, whose specialty is recombinant
engineering-the method of manipulating genetic material which has
garnered so much attention recently.51 While he was with General
Electric, Dr. Chakrabarty, using DNA recombining techniques, pro-
duced several new species of Pseudomonas bacteria possessing a unique
combination of properties which enable the organisms efficiently to
consume mixtures of heavy hydrocarbons, such as those found in crude
oil, and to convert them to ingestible protein. Prior Pseudomonas bac-
teria could consume only a specific heavy hydrocarbon each, or a rela-
tively small group of similar hydrocarbons, and different species would
not grow compatibly together to work on a complex mixture of heavy
hydrocarbons. 52 Chakrabarty's recombinant bacteria may prove useful
in dissipating oil spills and converting the crude petroleum into harm-
less protein; indeed, the bacteria may not only render an oil spill rela-
tively harmless, but turn it into a food source for marine life.53 General
Electric, however, perhaps in recognition of public wariness of recom-
binant DNA research, apparently has not yet tested Chakrabarty's or-
ganisms outside its laboratory.
The Chakrabarty Claim
Unlike Bergy's, Chakrabarty's patent application claimed his new
bacteria per se, not just pure cultures of them. Chakrabarty therefore
asked for even broader protection than Bergy, no doubt because his
bacterial species were created in the lab, whereas Bergy's was found in
the soil.
The Patent Examiner in charge of the Chakrabarty application al-
48. 437 U.S. 584 (1978).
49. In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952 (C.C.P.A. 1979).
50. 100 S. Ct. 261 (1979).
51. For a discussion of the possible dangers of recombinant engineering see Bomboy &
Rodgers, Genetic Tests. Safe Enough?, PARADE, May 13, 1979, at 15; Symposium, Biotech-
nology and the Law. Recombinant DNA and the Control of Scientfic Research, 51 S. CAL. L.
REV. 969, 969-1554 (1978).
52. See In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 969 (C.C.P.A. 1979).
53. See Gore, The Awesome World Within a Cell, 150 NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC 355,
374-75 (1976).
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lowed claims to the process of bioconverting hydrocarbons by use of
the new bacteria as well as claims to a composition comprised of straw
coated with the bacteria-the purpose of the straw is to hold the bacte-
ria in an oil slick-but the Examiner rejected the claims directed to the
bacteria themselves. The Examiner considered the latter claims im-
proper for two reasons: they were directed to products of nature and
bacteria were nonstatutory subject matter.54
On appeal, the Board disagreed with the Examiner's contention
that Chakrabarty's organisms were products of nature, but it affirmed
the other ground of the rejection-that bacteria do not fall within the
categories of patentable subject matter.55 Chakrabarty appealed to the
CCPA. In March of 1978, another three-to-two majority of the CCPA
reversed in Chakrabarty,5 6 citing its decision five months earlier in
Bergy5 7 The government petitioned for certiorari in Chakrabarty also.
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition,58 however, after the CCPA
vacated the judgment59 so that the case could be reconsidered in con-
junction with the vacated and remanded 60 Bergy case.
The Challenge to the Patent Office's Argument
Bergy and Chakrabarty Considered Together
Four days before it initially granted certiorari in Bergy, the
Supreme Court rendered a decision in another patent case, Parker v.
I7ook.61 In that case the Board had affirmed an Examiner's rejection
of an application for a utility patent on the ground that the invention
claimed did not fall within any of the categories of patentable subject
matter.62 The invention resided in a novel computer program for regu-
lating an alarm system used in monitoring a potentially explosive refin-
ery process. The claims sought by the applicant were for a method of
updating the value of an alarm limit in such a system. The CCPA re-
versed the Board, ruling that the invention was a "process"63 and, if
54. See In re Chakrabarty, 571 F.2d 40, 42 (C.C.P.A. 1978).
55. See id. at 42-43.
56. In re Chakrabarty, 571 F.2d 40 (C.C.P.A. 1978).
57. Id. at 43.
58. Banner v. Chakrabarty, 439 U.S. 801 (1978).
59. In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 957 (C.C.P.A. 1979).
60. Parker v. Bergy, 438 U.S. 902 (1978).
61. 437 U.S. 584 (1978).
62. See id. at 587.
63. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1976) extends patent protection to processes.
March 1980]
new and nonobvious, was deserving of a patent.64 Certiorari was
granted65 and the Supreme Court reversed the CCPA by a six-to-three
margin.66 The Court opined that no process could be patented when
the only novel and nonobvious aspect, as compared to the prior art,
was a mathematical algorithm employed in carrying out the process. 67
That, said the Court, would be tantamount to patenting a phenomenon
of nature, which is not the type of discovery the patent statutes were
enacted to protect. 68
Evidently believing that its reasoning in Flook might dictate the
result in Bergy, the Supreme Court, in the same order in which it issued
its writ of certiorari, vacated the CCPA's judgment in Bergy and di-
rected the court to reconsider that appeal in light of Flook.69 As previ-
ously noted, the CCPA followed the Supreme Court's lead and vacated
its first Chakrabarty decision as well. Reargument of both cases was
heard on November 16, 1978. The CCPA considered the Supreme
Court's decision in Flook, but a majority of the lower tribunal found it
inapposite to the issues in Bergy and Chakrabarty and again reversed
the Board of Appeals in both cases, this time in a combined decision
and by a greater majority of four-to-one.70 The Patent Office once
again petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari in both
cases. The Court granted that writ on October 29, 1979.7 1
The Patent Office's Argument
The Patent Office's insistence that bacteria themselves are not pat-
entable is based largely upon its reading of history and tradition. The
history of plant patents in the United States is central to its argument.
Although there appear to be no reported decisions squarely on
point,72 it was evidently a common belief by the patent bar prior to the
enactment of the Plant Patent Act in 1930 that plants were outside the
64. In re Flook, 559 F.2d 21 (C.C.P.A. 1977), rev'dsub nom. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S.
584 (1978).
65. Parker v. Flook, 434 U.S. 1033 (1978).
66. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978). For a discussion of that case, see Note,
Parker v. Flook and Computer Program Patents, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 1627 (1979).
67. 437 U.S. at 591-92.
68. Id. at 592.
69. Parker v. Bergy, 438 U.S. 902 (1978).
70. In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952 (C.C.P.A. 1979).
71. 100 S. Ct. 261 (1979).
72. Exparte Latimer, 46 OFFICIAL GAZETTE PAT. OFF. 1638 (1889), held unpatentable,
as a "natural product," certain spinnable wood fibers obtained from the needles of the tree
Pinus australis. No appellate level decision has been found, however, that expressly holds
that a new variety of plant was incapable of patent protection prior to the Plant Patent Act.
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categories of inventions set forth in the statute as eligible for utility
patent protection.73 Those categories, which were, simply, "any new
and useful art, machine, manufacture or composition of matter,"74 had
remained unchanged since 1793. Commentators shared similar beliefs
and considered plant researchers at that time to be without legal pro-
tection for their inventions.75
As the art of plant breeding became more and more a science in
the early part of the twentieth century, a lobbying effort emerged in this
country seeking federal legislation to permit the patenting of new plant
varieties. After years of trying, the proponents of change prevailed and
Congress passed the Plant Patent Act in 1930.76 The Act's provisions
have been carried forward in succeeding patent acts and they survive
today in the form of chapter 15, title 35 of the United States Code.
Since the enactment of the Plant Patent Act, there has been no need to
reconsider the time honored view that utility patents could not properly
be granted for plants.
The Patent Office contends that the only apparent reason for the
traditional view that plants were categorically ineligible for utility pat-
ent protection is that the utility patent categories of "art, machine,
manufacture [and] composition of matter" never were intended to em-
brace living organisms. 77 Arguing by extension, and pleading for con-
sistency, the Patent Office contends that neither should bacteria or any
Perhaps no such decision can be found because it was so commonly accepted then that
plants could not be patented that no one bothered to test it.
73. See Thorne, Relation of Patent Law to Natural Products, 6 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 23
(1923), which states: "[P]lants and animal organisms, even though very valuable uses may
be discovered for them, or they may have been obtained by the aid of scientific management
in their propagation, grow as natural products, and as such they are not discoveries which
are subject to patentable protection." Id. at 25. See also Hearings Before the Committee on
H.. 11372, A Bill to Providefor Plant Patents, 71st Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1930) (Memorandum
of Thomas E. Robertson, Commissioner of Patents) ("the present patent law does not make
it possible to grant patents for plants asexually reproduced").
74. Act of Feb. 21, 1793, ch. 11, § 1, 1 Stat. 318; Act of July 4, 1836, ch. 357, § 6, 5 Stat.
117; Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 24, 16 Stat. 198; Act of Mar. 3, 1897, ch. 391, § 1, 29 Stat.
692 (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1976)).
75. See Dienner, Patenisfor Biological Specimens andProducts, 35 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'Y
286, 289 (1953); Robb, Plant Patents in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PATENT PRACTICE AND
INVENTION MANAGEMENT 641, 642 (R. Calvert ed. 1964); Rossman, Plant Patents, 13 J.
PAT. OFF. Soc'y 7, 10 (1931); Comment, Patent Law-Patentability as Affected by the Law of
Nature Rules-The Kalo Doctrine, 47 MICH. L. Rnv. 391, 394-96 (1949).
76. Pub. L. No. 245, ch. 312, 46 Stat. 376 (1930) (codified at 35 U.S.C. §§ 161-164
(1976)).
77. Exparte Bergy, 197 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 78, 79 (Pat. & Trademark Office Bd. App.
1976).
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other living organism be claimable as such in a utility patent.
78
None of the Congresses that enacted the pre-1930 patent acts left a
legislative history that speaks to the question of whether they intended
the utility patent categories to embrace bacteria, microorganisms in
general, or any form of living matter. Nor have there been any court
decisions directly on point.79 Nevertheless, for many years it had been
widely assumed that microorganisms per se could not be claimed in
utility patents. 80
78. In a 1940 case, In re Arzberger, 112 F.2d 834 (C.C.P.A. 1940), the CCPA consid-
ered whether bacteria might come within the provisions of the Plant Patent Act, since some
botanists and bacteriologists had considered bacteria to be a type of plant. The court held
that they did not come within the Act, however, because not considered plants "in the com-
mon language of the people." Id. at 837.
79. In Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127 (1948), the closest case
in facts, utility patent claims to a mixture of a plurality of previously known species of
bacteria of the genus Rhizobium in an inanimate carrier, e.g., humus, were held invalid on
the ground that the mixture (termed an "inoculant"), although novel, was not sufficiently
inventive. The Court declined to consider in that case whether other statutory requirements
were met by the claims. Id. at 132. Judging by the opinion of the appellate court below, no
issue was raised in Kalo as to whether an inoculant came within the statutory categories of
invention. See Kalo Inoculant Co. v. Funk Bros. Seed Co., 161 F.2d 981 (7th Cir. 1947),
rev'd, 333 U.S. 127 (1948).
80. That assumption underlay a 1953 article by a distinguished Chicago patent attor-
ney who urged that the United States provide patent protection for new biological specimens
and products, so as to provide inducement to workers in the "yeast and fungus producing
enterprises and the like." Dienner, Patentsfor Biological Specimens andProducts, 35 J. PAT.
OFF. Soc'Y 286, 290 (1953). See also S. REP. No. 315, 71st Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1930); H.R.
REP. No. 1129, 71st Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1930) (letter of Arthur M. Hyde, Secretary of Agri-
culture) (patent laws cover inventions or discoveries in field of inanimate nature); Comment,
Patent Law-Patentability as Affected by the Law of Nature Rules-The Kalo Doctrine, 47
MICH. L. REV. 391, 395 (1949) (as of 1949, bacteria are still unpatentable). In 1966, the
Patent, Trademark and Copyright Law Section of the American Bar Association passed a
resolution calling for extension of the patent system to biological arts. [1966] ABA SECTION
OF PATENT, TRADEMARK AND COPYRIGHT LAW, SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS 74. In 1974,
Judge Rich of the CCPA, in apparent contradiction to his position in Bergy, observed as an
aside in his opinion for the majority in In re Mancy, 499 F.2d 1289 (C.C.P.A. 1974): "Here
appellants not only have no allowed claim to the novel strain of streptomyces used in their
process but would, we presume (without deciding), be unable to obtain such a claim because
the strain, while new in the sense that it is not shown by any art of record, is, as we under-
stand it, a 'product of nature.'" Id. at 1294.
A contrary view was expressed, however, in Note, Microbiological Plant Patents, 10
IDEA 87 (1966). Ironically, the authors were assistant examiners with the Patent Office at
the time. They suggested that microorganisms might be considered compositions of matter
within 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1976). Eight years later, Wegner, acknowledging the existence of a
"general prejudice against granting claims to a live microorganism, per se," argued that the
prejudice was unfounded and that microorganisms should be considered manufactures.
Wegner, Patent Protection for Novel Microorganisms Useful/or the Preparation of Known
Products, 5 INT'L REV. INDUSTRIAL PROP. COPYRIGHT LAW 285, 288, 290 (1974). Evidently
Bergy and Chakrabarty were the first to act on those suggestions.
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The Majority CCPA Opinion in Bergy
In reconsidering both the Bergy and Chakrabarty applications, the
CCPA majority, led by Judge Rich,81 reached the same conclusion it
had before. Speaking to the Patent Office's principal argument-the
history of the 1930 Plant Patent Act-Judge Rich agreed that prior to
1930 plants were considered outside the province of utility patents, but
disagreed with the Office as to the basis for that belief. Judge Rich
argued that plants were considered unpatentable not because they were
animate, but rather principally because of the traditional view that
plants were "products of nature."82 The product-of-nature rejection 83
dates at least as far back as 188984 and is premised on the assertion that
no objects found in nature may be patented in the form in which they
occur in nature. 85 As mentioned earlier, for example, had Bergy and
his co-workers attempted to claim Streptomyces vellosus per se, rather
than the biologically pure culture thereof, their claim would have been
suspectible to this rejection because they had found Streptomyces vel-
losus in the soil.86
For seventy-five years or more, the product-of-nature doctrine was
81. Judge Rich wrote for himself, Chief Judge Markey, and Judge Lane (since de-
ceased). A concurring opinion was written by Judge Baldwin, who had dissented the first
time around. In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 988 (C.C.P.A. 1979). Judge Miller dissented, argu-
ing essentially that the Patent Office was correct. Id. at 999.
82. Id. at 982. See Kip, The Patentability of Natural Phenomena, 20 GEO. WASH. L.
Rv. 371 (1952).
83. See text accompanying note 42 supra.
84. See Exparte Latimer, 46 OFFICIAL GAZETrE PAT. OFF. 1638 (1889).
85. See Note, Patents-Composition of Matter-Patentability of a Natural Product, 27
GEo. WASH. L. REv. 256, 257 (1958); Comment, Patent Law-Patentability as.Affectedby the
Law ofANature Rules-.The Kalo Doctrine, 47 MICH. L. REv. 391, 395 (1949).
86. The product-of-nature doctrine perhaps reached its apex in another case involving
Chakrabarty's assignee: General Electric Co. v. De Forest Radio Co., 28 F.2d 641 (3d Cir.
1928), cert. denied, 278 U.S. 656 (1929). That case involved a patent for elemental tungsten,
which is tungsten in the free metal form, uncombined with any other elements. Tungsten is
mined in various oxide forms. It has never been found in nature in its elemental state. That
uncombined form evidently was made for the first time in 1909, after years of research, by
Thomas Edison's close friend and colleague, William D. Coolidge. Coolidge found that
incandescent lamp elements made of his free-metal-form tungsten far surpassed, in terms of
endurance, any other filaments then known. In fact, elemental tungsten filaments were so
much longer lived than what had been used before that Coolidge's discovery revolutionized
the electric light industry practically overnight. Even today the most pervasive use of ele-
mental tungsten is to make such filaments for household light bulbs. In 1913, General Elec-
tric succeeded in obtaining an immensely important patent claiming elemental tungsten.
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals held the patent invalid, however, apparently on the
assumption, despite all the evidence, that the metal must have existed in elemental form in
nature at some time or other during the earth's history and, therefore, was unpatentable. Id.
at 643.
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invoked by the Patent Office and the courts to reject or invalidate vari-
ous patent claims without reference to specific statutory support.87
Gradually, the doctrine came to be thought of as an interpretation of
the provision of section 101 that utility patents are obtainable only for
"new" processes, machines, manufactures, or compositions of matter.8 8
The reasoning proffered was that products pre-existing in nature were
not "new" and therefore could not be considered patentable subject
matter under section 101.89 The CCPA ultimately rejected that analy-
sis, however, contending that if the product-of-nature rejection had any
validity, it was as a shorthand expression of the failure of naturally
occurring material to meet the detailed "novelty" requirements of sec-
tion 102.90 In the view of the CCPA, that section was intended to de-
fine the word "new" as used in section 101. 9 1 Absolute novelty is not
required, however, as section 102 does not always preclude obtaining a
patent on something that existed prior to an applicant's discovery.92
Moreover, in the CCPA's most recent decision involving a product-of-
nature rejection, In re Kratz,93 the court left open the question of
whether such a rejection is proper when the claimed material existed
unrecognized in nature, noting that support for such a rejection can be
found only in dicta.94
Judge Rich reasoned that the product-of-nature rejection, once
thought applicable to new plant varieties, is inapplicable to the bacteria
of Chakrabarty and the pure cultures of Bergy and his co-workers be-
cause the formation of those materials occurred only as a result of di-
87. See, e.g., In re Macallum, 102 F.2d 614 (C.C.P.A. 1939); Perkins Glue Co. v. Stan-
dard Furniture Co., 287 F. 109 (2d Cir. 1923), cert denied, 262 U.S. 752 (1923); Exparte
Snell, 86 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 496 (Pat. & Trademark Office Bd. App. 1950); Exparte Grayson,
51 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 413 (Pat. & Trademark Office Bd. App. 1941); Exparte Latimer, 46
OFFICIAL GAZETTE PAT. OFF. 1638 (1889).
88. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1976).
89. See, e.g., Exparte Siddiqui, 156 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 426 (Pat. & Trademark Office Bd.
App. 1966); Jacob, Patentability of Natural Products, 52 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 473 (1970) (here-
inafter cited as Jacob].
90. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1976). SeeIn re Kratz, 201 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 71 (C.C.P.A. 1979); In
re Bergstrom, 472 F.2d 1394 (C.C.P.A. 1970). See also Jacob, supra note 89.
91. In re Kratz, 201 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 71, 75 (C.C.P.A. 1979).
92. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1976). For instance, if a novel chemical compound were synthe-
sized by a chemist who then abandoned all interest in it and kept the records a secret, a
worker who later independently made the same discovery might obtain a patent on the
compound. Cf. Mason v. Hepburn, 13 App. D.C. 86 (1898) (later inventor of firearm enti-
tled to patent over earlier inventor who had not disclosed invention); Woofter v. Carlson,
367 F.2d 436 (C.C.P.A. 1966) (failure to file application for 8 years constituted forfeiture of
right to a patent).
93. 201 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 71 (C.C.P.A. 1979).
94. Id. at 75.
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rect human intervention. Why the same could not have been said of
Luther Burbank's new plant varieties, for example, Rich did not state.
He only remarked that prior to the time of Burbank, who died in 1926,
all plants were "regarded as products of nature. 95
A second reason noted by Judge Rich for the view before 1930 that
new plant varieties were not patentable was that the phrase "new and
useful art, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter"96 was at
that time perceived as referring to industrial inventions only. Plant
breeding, engaged in primarily by government and amateur horticul-
turists, was not then considered an industrial endeavor.97 Rich con-
cluded that such a notion has no validity when applied to today's
microbiological research, pointing out that it is American industry
which is on the threshold of a major advance in microorganism tech-
nology: the field of molecular biology, a new branch of a useful art
which has existed for many years.98 Rich had no doubt concerning the
essential characteristic of the Bergy and Chakrabarty bacteria: "What
we deal with here. . . is an industrial product used in an industrial
process in a useful or technological art." 99
The final reason cited by the CCPA for the pre-1930 belief that
plants could not be patented turned on the requirement that the object
claimed be sufficiently described in the patent's written specification
and drawings to enable the public to make it, i e., to practice the inven-
tion.1°° As for plants, however, Judge Rich noted that in 1930 a mere
written description of a new plant variety was insufficient to enable
others to duplicate the plant. For that reason, the Plant Patent Act spe-
cifically exempted an applicant for a plant patent from providing any-
thing more than a description which is "as complete as is reasonably
possible." o Contrasting the position of plant discoveries early in this
century to that of microbiological discoveries, Judge Rich noted that
industrially useful microorganism inventions, such as those of Bergy
and Chakrabarty, have always been readily described and claimed so
as to comply with the written description and claiming provisions of
the patent laws.' 02
95. In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 982 (C.C.P.A. 1979).
96. Act of Mar. 3, 1897, ch. 391, § 1, 29 Stat. 692 (1897) (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 101
(1976)).
97. In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 981 (C.C.P.A. 1979).
98. Id. at 974.
99. Id.
100. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1976).
101. In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 984 (C.C.P.A. 1979) (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 162 (1976)).
102. In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 984 (C.C.P.A. 1979). See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1976).
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The majority in Bergy thus analyzed the 1930 Plant Patent Act as
legislation extending patent protection to materials previously consid-
ered unpatentable because they were natural products, were in a previ-
ously nonindustrial field, and were not susceptible to exact verbal
description, not because they were living organisms. Therefore, rea-
soned the majority of the court, that legislation holds no implication for
the patentability of other organisms, such as the bacteria of Bergy and
Chakrabarty, that are industrial inventions, are not natural products,
and are susceptible to precise description. 10 3
Finding no guidance from the plant patent legislation, nor from
judicial precedent, 1°4 Judge Rich looked to other authorities for inter-
pretation of the statutory terms "manufacture" and "composition of
matter." Two comments on the intended scope of section 101 of the
1952 Patent Act formed his principal support: one, a statement in the
103. In his opinion in Bergy, Rich did not go so far as to say that words alone could
define microorganisms with the same precision that they can define chemical compounds. It
is commonly held, in fact, that they cannot. See Robbins, Patentsfor Microbiological Trans-
formations-an International Problem, 42 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 830, 832 (1960). For that rea-
son, and because microorganisms cannot be assembled from stock chemicals, when the
subject of a patent application is an invention that depends on the use of a microorganism,
the Patent Office requires that the microorganism be readily available to the public. In some
cases this necessitates depositing a culture of the microorganism in a public culture collec-
tion. U.S. PATENT OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE 48.7 (3d ed. rev.
1978).
104. Few cases have offered definitions of "manufacture" or "composition of matter" as
those terms are used in § 101. In the only Supreme Court case to do so, American Fruit
Growers Inc. v. Brogdex Co., 283 U.S. 1 (1931), the Court was asked to decide whether an
orange whose rind had been impregnated with a chemical preservative was a "manufac-
ture." The Court adopted a dictionary definition of the term, concluding it included any
article produced "for use from raw or prepared materials by giving to these materials new
forms, qualities, properties, or combinations, whether by hand labor or by machinery." The
Court concluded the treated orange did not meet this definition. Id. at 11. A dictionary
definition of "manufacture" also was adopted in Riter-Conley Mfg. Co. v. Aiken, 203 F. 699
(3d Cir. 1913). The court concluded "manufacture" embraced "anything made from raw
materials by hand, by machinery, or by art" and held the claimed roof structure was within
this definition. Id. at 701-02. In Binney & Smith Co. v. United Carbon Co., 125 F.2d 255
(4th Cir. 1942) (pelleted carbon black), the court quoted approvingly a definition of "manu-
facture" that had been given a half century earlier in Johnson v. Johnston, 60 F. 618, 620
(W.D. Pa. 1894) (index book): "The term 'manufacture,' as used in the patent law, has a
very comprehensive sense, embracing whatever is made by the art or industry of man, not
being a machine, a composition of matter, or a design." 125 F.2d at 258. The inventions in
both Binney and Johnson were held to be manufactures. See also Ex parte Mowry and
Hedrick, 110 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 389, 390 (Pat. & Trademark Office Bd. App. 1955).
One decision, in dictum, has offered a definition of "composition of matter": "This
phrase covers all compositions of two or more substances and includes all composite articles,
whether they be results of chemical union, or of mechanical mixture, or whether they be
gases, fluids, powders or solids." Shell Development Co. v. Watson, 149 F. Supp. 279, 280
(D.D.C. 1957).
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legislative history; the other, an analysis published some fifteen years
after the passage of the Act by one of its principal drafters.
First, Judge Rich noted that both the House and Senate reports
preceding the enactment of the 1952 Patent Act stated that the
"machine" and "manufacture" categories of invention in section 101
"may include anything under the sun that is made by man."'10 5 The
second source relied upon by Rich was an article 10 6 published in 1967
by P.J. Federico, a member of the Patent Office Board of Appeals who,
along with Judge Rich, was one of the drafters of the 1952 Act. In his
article, Federico observed that the phrase "art, machine, manufacture
or composition of matter" delineated a "general industrial boundary"
of patentable subject matter. 107 Further, Federico added: "[T]he
general field [of patentable subject matter] may be considered as con-
sisting of new things and new acts."' 0 8
Seizing on these statements, Judge Rich was convinced that if the
Bergy and Chakrabarty bacteria were useful things made by man for
industry, then they plainly were within the intended purview of section
101. He had no difficulty in finding that the appellants' microorga-
nisms met those criteria and readily concluded that their bacteria must
be proper subject matter for a utility patent, adding this discussion:
In fact we see no legally significant difference between active
chemicals which are classified as "dead" and organisms used for
their chemical reactions which take place because they are "alive."
Life is largely chemistry. We think the purposes underlying the pat-
ent system require us to include microorganisms and cultures within
the terms "manufacture" and "composition of matter" in § 101.
Whether they otherwise qualify for patents under § 102 and § 103 is a
question not before us. In short, we think the fact that microorga-
nisms are alive is a distinction without legal significance and that
they should be treated under § 101 no differently from chemical
compounds. 0 9
Judge Rich concluded the majority opinion by chiding the Patent
Office for what seemed a clear inconsistency between its position in
Bergy and its established practice of allowing utility patent claims that
differ little from those denied the appellants. Judge Rich noted that the
Office's insistence that living organisms themselves are not proper sub-
105. H.R. REP. No. 1923, 82nd Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1952), reprintedin [1952] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 2394; S. REP. No. 1979, 82nd Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1952), reprinted in
[1952] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2399.
106. P. Federico, Section 101: Subject Matterfor Patents, in LAW OF CHEMICAL, MET-
ALLURGICAL AND PHARMACEUTICAL PATENTS 53 (1967).
107. Id. at 58.
108. Id.
109. 596 F.2d at 975 (emphasis in original).
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ject matter for utility patent claims appeared at odds with its policy of
allowing such claims for compositions that contain living organisms.
As examples of the latter, Judge Rich called attention to the allowed
claims of Chakrabarty for his microorganisms supported on straw, as
well as to previously granted utility patent claims for bird seed coated
with a medicament, 1"0 for inoculated poultry eggs, "' and for vaccines
containing attenuated, but still live, viruses. 1 2 The two positions, the
court suggested, were irreconcilable.
Some Observations and Speculations On Bergy and
Chakrabarty
The Federico Quotation in the Majority Opinion
Federico, on reading the majority opinion in In re Bergy, might
well have been surprised to see his 1967 statement that section 101 de-
lineates a "general industrial boundary" of patentable subject matter
used in support of the court's ruling. Thirty years before writing the
statement quoted by the CCPA, Federico published an article in which
he noted without dissent the accepted view that microorganisms were
not patentable subject matter."l 3 At the time Federico's article was
written, the Patent Act of 1870,114 as amended, was still in effect. The
statute was revised in 1952, but there is no reason to assume that the
revision caused Federico to change his mind as to the patentability of
microorganisms. The Senate Report regarding the 1952 Patent Act ex-
plained that no substantive changes were intended in section 101 ex-
cept, arguably, some enlargement of the category of processes that
110. See U.S. Patent No. 3,080,285, summarized in 788 OFFICIAL GAZETrE PAT. OFF.
209 (1963).
111. See U.S. Patent No. 2,851,006, summarized in 734 OFFICIAL GAZETrE PAT. OFF.
367 (1958).
112. See U.S. Patents Nos. 2,271,819, summarized in 535 OFFICIAL GAZETTE PAT. OFF.
112 (1942); 2,518,978, summarized in 637 OFFICIAL GAZETTE PAT. OFF. 864 (1950);
2,966,443, summarized in 761 OFFICIAL GAZETTE PAT. OFF. 1060 (1960).
113. Federico, Louis Pasteur's Patents, 86 SCIENCE 327 (1937). The article noted that
Louis Pasteur had patented two inventions in the United States, one of which, patented in
1873, concerned the process invented for purifying yeast to use in brewing beer. One of the
claims read: "Yeast, free from organic germs of disease, as an article of manufacture." See
U.S. Patent No. 141,072, summarized in 4 OFFICIAL GAZETTE PAT. OFF. 91 (1873). Federico
said of that particular claim: "lilt is unique in patents in respect to its subject-matter. A
claim of this type would now probably be refused by the examiner, since it may be doubted
that the subject-matter is capable of being patented." Federico, Louis Pasteur's Patents, 86
SCIENCE 327 (1937). Yeasts, of course, are microorganisms.
114. Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, 16 Stat. 198.
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might be patented.1I5 Presumably, then, when Federico wrote in 1967
that section 101 delineates a "general industrial boundary" of patenta-
ble subject matter, he did not intend to suggest that it encompasses mi-
croorganisms.
Utility Patents Directed to Other Living Organisms
The Bergy majority, in pointing out the various types of utility
patent claims which the Patent Office routinely allows for compositions
that are mixtures of living organisms and inanimate materials, put its
finger on what might be considered an embarrassing truth for the Of-
fice. If Chakrabarty's novel bacteria are not considered manufactures
or compositions of matter, by what logic does a mixture of them with
an inert carrier become such? It cannot be said that the mixture was
created by a person but that the bacteria were not, nor that the bacteria
are alive but the mixture is not. Nevertheless, the Patent Office treats
the two differently. In the inoculation art, for example, the Office regu-
larly allows utility patent claims to live vaccines, I 6 which are nothing
more than suspensions of attenuated bacteria, viruses, or rickettsiae in
a harmless diluent such as water or gelatin. The Office, however, to
date has not approved a claim to attenuated microorganisms them-
selves, presumably because such microorganisms would be considered
"living matter." The same is true of tissue cultures, which are suspen-
sions of live cells in aqueous nutrient media; the suspensions may be
claimed in a utility patent, I7 but the cells themselves, even if novel,
may not.
The conclusion to be reached from examining the Patent Office's
practice in these areas is that evidently the Office makes a fundamental
distinction between compositions partly alive and compositions wholly
alive. The statutory basis for such a distinction is far from apparent.
115. See S. REP. No. 1979, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 5, 17 (1952), reprinted in [1952] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2399. Federico himself noted the Senate Report accurately re-
flects the changes made by the 1952 Patent Act. See Federico, Commentary on the New
Patent Act, 35 U.S.C.A. at 1, 9 (1954).
116. Class 424, subclass 93 of the Patent Office's official patent classification, is dedi-
cated to patents claiming "Drug, Bio-Affecting and Body Treatment Compositions [Con-
taining] Whole Live Microorganism or Virus. ... ." U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK
OFFICE, MANUAL OF CLASSIFICATION 424-1 (1979) (emphasis added). This includes vac-
cines. See also note 24 supra.
117. See U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE MANUAL OF CLASSIFICATION (1979)
(patents classified in Class 195, subclasses 1.1 and 1.8).
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Plant Patents at the Outer Limits
Other issues related to Bergy but not discussed in the opinion are
raised by the Patent Office's willingness to stretch the adjudicated defi-
nition of "plant" when issuing a plant patent for a nonbacterial organ-
ism. On the basis of those patents, one may question the sincerity of
the Patent Office's position in Bergy.
In In re Arzberger, 118 the CCPA ruled that bacteria are not subject
to plant patent protection because Congress, when it used the word
"plant," meant "[a] young tree, shrub, or herb, planted or ready to
plant; a slip, cutting or sapling."' 19 Further, an arguably more restric-
tive definition of "plant" was given in dicta by Judge Rich in Bergy,
where he stated:
While the term "plant" taxonomically includes many living orga-
nisms, most of these things are not included in the common, ordinary
meaning of the term, which is limited to those things having roots,
stems, leaves and flowers or fruits. Our thorough examination of the
express terms of the 1930 act, as well as its legislative history, con-
firms our belief that Congress was using the term in the common,
ordinary sense just defined .... 120
It is difficult to imagine mushrooms fitting either definition, yet the
Patent Office, apparently without hesitation, has granted plant patents
for just that: new, useful, and nonobvious varities of mushrooms. 121
In the final analysis, the granting of mushroom patents may have
little bearing on the force of the Patent Office's argument in
Bergy/Chakrabarty. More harmful to the Office's case, however, is a
plant patent issued only a few months prior to the CCPA's decision in
In re Bergy for a microbe sizefungus, evidently the first such patent to
be granted. On December 12, 1978, Plant Patent No. 4347122 was
granted for a unique strain of the fungus Fusarium graminearum which
had been isolated from a soil sample from a garden in Buckingham-
shire, England. 123 The reason for the interest in patenting that particu-
lar strain of Fusarium graminearum was that its mycelium, the
vegetative portion of its growth, was rich in protein and could be eaten
118. 112 F.2d 834 (C.C.P.A. 1940).
119. Id. at 838.
120. 596 F.2d 952, 980 n.15 (C.C.P.A. 1979) (emphasis added).
121. See, e.g., Plant Patent Nos. 27, summarized in 422 OFFICIAL GAZETTE PAT. OFF.
640 (1932); 2050, summarizedin 769 OFFICIAL GAZETTE PAT. OFF. 1059 (1961).
122. Plant Patent No. 4347, summarized in 977 OFFICIAL GAZETTE PAT. OFF. 341
(1978).
123. Prior to a grant, a final rejection of the patent application, on grounds not relevant
to this discussion, was reversed by the Patent and Trademark Office Board of Appeals. See
Exparte Solomons, 201 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 42 (Pat. & Trademark Office Bd. App. 1978).
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safely. Fusarium graminearum, however, is a microorganism and thus
more akin to bacteria than to a "tree, shrub, or herb," or "things having
roots, stems, leaves, and flowers or fruits." So similar are microfungi
and bacteria, in fact, that experts frequently disagree as to where to
draw the line between them. One of the most debated questions in
microbiology, for instance, has been whether the actinomycetes, which
is the class of microorganisms that includes the antibiotic-producing
Streptomyces, are bacteria or fungi. Only after many years of debate
were they determined to be the former. 124
This discussion merely illustrates that while the Patent Office's ar-
guments in Bergy appear to advocate a position categorically opposed
to issuing patents under the present statutes for any living organisms
other than higher plants, the Office. has failed at times to act in a man-
ner consistent with that position. This inconsistency, when viewed in
light of the arguments of Judge Rich distinguishing the product-of-na-
ture rejection from the instant cases, however, points to the substantial
problems with the Patent Office position in Bergy.
How Much Is At Stake in Supreme Court Review?
Despite the potential weaknesses of the Patent Office position, the
Supreme Court decisions in Parker v. Rook 125 and American Fruit
Growers v. Brogdex Co. 126 must be reckoned with. Both decisions have
revealed the Court's inclination to interpret rather narrowly the catego-
ries of invention set forth in section 101. Writing for the majority in
Hook, Justice Stevens announced: "It is our duty to construe the pat-
ent statutes as they now read, in light of our prior precedents, and we
must proceed cautiously when we are asked to extend patent rights into
areas wholly unforeseen by Congress."127 In view of the fact that the
American Bar Association's Patent, Trademark and Copyright Law
Section has characterized its proposal endorsing patent protection for
microorganism claims as an "Extension of [the] Patent System to Bio-
logical Arts Not Now Covered,"' 128 Justice Steven's remark can only be
taken as an ominous portent for the respondents in Bergy.
Moreover, there may be more at stake in Supreme Court review
124. See Waksman, Species Concept Among the Actinomycetes with Special Reference to
the Genus Streptomyces, 21 BACTERIOLOGICAL REVIEWS 1, 6 (1957).
125. 437 U.S. 584 (1978).
126. 283 U.S. 1 (1931).
127. 437 U.S. at 596 (emphasis added).
128. [1966] ABA SECTION OF PATENT, TRADEMARK AND COPYRIGHT LAW, SUMMARY
OF PROCEEDINGS 74 (emphasis added).
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than the ability to obtain claims to bacteria per se. Judge Rich's expo-
sure of the apparent inconsistency in the Patent Office's position al-
lowing claims to partly-alive compositions, but not to those wholly-
alive, is sound criticism and undoubtedly will attract the Supreme
Court's attention. Conceivably, if the Court concludes that bacteria are
neither "compositions of matter" nor "manufactures," then, following
its rationale in Flook, it could hold that any living matter product,
whether partly or wholly alive, that differs from the prior art only in the
identity of the animate material in the product, is unpatentable under
section 101. If so, that decision would cloud many of the patents al-
ready granted for partly-alive compositions and no doubt would result
in a new policy at the Patent Office. Claims the Office has thus far been
willing to allow, such as Chakrabarty's claims to bacteria carried on
straw, would be measured by a stricter test of patentability, a test that
many undoubtedly would fail.129
The "Biologically Pure" Limitation
In writing for the Bergy majority, Judge Rich emphasized and re-
lied upon the fact that the Bergy team refined Streptomyces vellosus to a
"biologically pure culture" before finding it useful for producing linco-
mycin.130 The implications of that premise seem to be far-reaching, for
what Bergy and his co-workers apparently referred to as "biologically
pure" is a degree of lack of contamination that is always achieved, and
needed, when seriously working with microorganisms.
The search for new microorganisms goes on continuously in mi-
crobiological laboratories around the world. Patient screening of an
endless succession of soil samples is required. The procedure usually
involves swirling the soil in water to wash out a portion of the soil
population of microscopic organisms, decanting and diluting the wash
water, flooding a shallow plate of nutrient agar with part of the micro-
organism-bearing water, and then incubating the agar plate to permit
the microorganisms to produce a visible growth on the surface of the
agar. If the microorganism suspension is not sufficiently dilute, the re-
129. The Patent Office Solicitor suggested in his original brief to the CCPA in the appeal
from the Chakrabarty decision that the Examiner might withdraw the allowance of the
claims to the combination of Chakrabarty's bacteria supported on straw, if the rejection of
the microorganism per se claims were upheld: "Consideration has also been given to appel-
lant's observation that 'it is strange indeed that claims for the bacterium on a carrier are
allowable, while claims to the organism are not.' In light of the decision of the Board in In re
Bergy. . .there may be an anomaly, which can be rectified on return of this case to the
Office." Brief for the Commissioner at 22, Patent Appeal No. 77-535.
130. 596 F.2d at 968.
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sult is a tangled mass of mixed microorganism colonies. 131 Dilution
adjustments are then made and the flooding and incubation steps re-
peated until the microorganisms grow in separate colonies on the agar.
If one of the colonies appears different from previously known micro-
organisms, part of it is removed from the agar and regrown on fresh
agar for closer examination. When grown separate from the rest of the
soil population, the microorganism culture is termed an "isolate." 132
The Bergy specification does not define the term "biologically pure
culture." Indeed, the expression appears only in the appealed claim,
which was added to the original application by amendment. But read
in context the expression seems to mean nothing more than an isolate
obtained in the manner just described. No greater degree of purity is
disclosed in the specification or suggested in the court's opinion.
As just indicated, however, there is nothing unique about working
with a microorganism in isolate form since a "pure" microorganism is
necessary for identification or study and for starting a fermentation re-
action using the microorganism. Every bacteria, yeast, or microfungus
ever discovered.has been refined to isolate purity in the very process of
discovery and identification, and each has been preserved in culture
collections in that condition. Upjohn's attorneys, in prosecuting the
Bergy patent application, submitted affidavits by company microbiolo-
gists that admitted as much. Judge Rich referred to those affidavits in
the majority opinion. 133 Thus the CCPA, in reaching its conclusion in
Bergy, apparently recognized that the normal condition of industrial
microorganisms is "biologically pure."
The import of the CCPA holding in In re Bergy therefore would
seem to be that all discoveries of soil bacteria that are new, useful, and
nonobvious should merit utility patents claiming the microorganisms
themselves in "biologically pure" form-patents which for all practical
purposes could not be avoided by anyone who wished to grow, use, or
sell the bacteria. Apparently, by the addition of those two words "bio-
logically pure," a claim that might otherwise meet with disapproval by
the CCPA under the product-of-nature doctrine 34 is made allowable,
and without restricting the effective scope of the patent. In other
13 1. S.A. Waksman, the Nobel Prize winning discoverer of streptomycin, observed that
Streptomyces bacteria, for example, "are found in the soil in hundreds of thousands of
spores and bits of mycelium per gram." Waksman, Species Among the Actinomycetes with
Special Reference to the Genus Streptomyces, 21 BACTERIOLOGICAL REVIEWS 1, 2 (1957).
132. See PELCZAR & REID, MICROBIOLOGY 139-43, 697-98 (3d ed. 1972); 1 HANDBOOK
OF MICROBIOLOGY 763 (Laskin & Lechevalier ed. 1973).
133. 596 F.2d at 972.
134. Cf. In re Macalium, 102 F.2d 614, 616 (C.C.P.A. 1939) (rejecting patent applica-
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words, if the views expressed in In re Bergy remain the law, it will
make no real difference whether a new and nonobvious strain or spe-
cies of bacteria is created in a lab, as Chakrabarty's was, or is found
naturally occurring in the soil, as was the case with the bacteria discov-
ered by Bergy and his coworkers. In either instance the researcher will
be able to obtain the fullest patent protection for the microorganism
that will ever be needed.
Conclusion
For several decades now industrial microbiology has been big
business in the United States; with the arrival of DNA recombinant
engineering it promises to grow even bigger. Microbial geneticists are
eager to attack a host of problems by redesigning existing microorga-
nisms. The development of new bacteria that can produce precious
medicaments now obtainable only by extraction from animal blood
and tissue is high on their list. Efforts to develop bacteria capable of
producing insulin and interferon already have met with some suc-
cess. 135 Substances such as thyroid hormone (used to treat cretinistic
dwarfism), endorphin (a pain blocker normally manufactured by the
body), and somatotropin (used to stimulate growth in cases of pituitary
deficiency) are just a few examples of other likely targets for this type
of research. There is hope, too, that a bacterium can be made that
could synthesize an antiviral vaccine capable of combating some of the
virulent new forms of venereal disease caused by herpes virus. In addi-
tion, numerous non-medicinal applications are contemplated, a prime
example being the development of a nitrogen-fixing bacterium that will
grow on the roots of various grain crops, thus obviating the necessity
for a farmer periodically to remove a field from production to restore
the soil's nitrogen content.
All of these research pursuits require money, and the companies
involved in them understandably want the opportunity to protect their
successes. Method-of-use patents may do the job in many cases, but
researchers fear that such protection may not always be sufficient; mi-
crobiologists consequently desire patent protection equal to that which
chemical inventors receive.
The sentiments of microbiological researchers on this issue might
best be told by harking back to a similar time sixty years ago when fear
tion in part because "slight degree of purity" greater than that found in prior art not consid-
ered novel).
135. See note I supra.
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of the prowess of German chemical companies prompted some in the
United States to advocate a revision of our patent laws to do away with
claims for chemical compounds. As a chemist-patent attorney wrote in
opposition to the proposal (read "microbiologist" for "chemist"):
To deprive the chemist of his reward for his labor by taking away his
'product' claim (whatever that 'product' may be) is the same to him
as depriving the machinist of his claim to his machine or the weaver
to his new article in the way of a fabric. It is not good equity; and
moreover it is not good sense. The object of the patent laws is to
promote the progress of science and the useful arts, and that they
have fulfilled their mission is beyond a peradventure. Why stop now
and stop in a single science? 136
The CCPA has sided with the microbiologists in their quest for
equal treatment. It remains to be seen whether the Supreme Court will
agree, or whether it will pass the buck to Congress.' 37
Postscript
While this Article was being published, the patent claims of the
Bergy team to the biologically pure bacterium Streptomyces vellosus
were cancelled.' Hence, despite the Bergy team's victory in the United
States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals,2 the Supreme Court will
not review their patent application.3 The patent application of the
Chakrabarty team remains before the Court, however.4 The primary
implication of this development, as it relates to the pending decision of
the Court, is that the Court no longer will have reason to address the
ramifications of the "biologically pure" limitation placed solely on the
Bergy claim.5
136. McElroy, Product Patents, 10 J. IND. & ENG. CHEM. 257, 258 (1918).
137. An interesting alternative to federal legislation might arise, however, if the
Supreme Court concludes that Congress has indicated neither that it wishes to protect, nor
to free from protection, new and unobvious bacteria per se, but has merely "left the area
unattended." Arguably, such a decision could open the way for state legislation authorizing
some form of protection for such organisms. Cf. Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 570
(1973) (state law on pirating of recordings not violative of supremacy clause; prior to 1971
federal copyright law amendments, Congress had "left the area unattended").
1. 48 U.S.L.W. 3447 (1980); see462 PATENT, TRADEMARK AND COPYRIGHT JOURNAL
(BNA) A-1 1 (1980); 461 PATENT, TRADEMARK AND COPYRIGHT JOURNAL (BNA) A-8 to A-
9 (1980).
2. In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952 (C.C.P.A. 1979).
3. See 462 PATENT, TRADEMARK AND COPYRIGHT JOURNAL (BNA) A-Il (1980); 461
PATENT, TRADEMARK AND COPYRIGHT JOURNAL (BNA) A-8 to A-9 (1980).
4. See notes 50-60 & accompanying text supra.
5. See notes 40-50, 130-34 & accompanying text supra.
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